MIP101: Maker Atlas Immutable Alignment Artifact

0: Definitions

1: The Atlas

This MIP specifies the legacy Atlas. The legacy Atlas will soon be upgraded to Atlas v2, which is a version of the Atlas that no longer relies on the legacy MIP system, and consists of a single file that contain all Atlas Documents as a nested tree.

Before the upgrade to Atlas v2, there may be inconsistencies in the Atlas, and between Atlas and the Scopes. In case of conflicts between the Atlas and the Scopes, the Scopes takes precedence as they are generally more up to date.

Facilitators must be careful in using their judgement and common sense to ensure that all interpretations and use of their powers is in accordance with the goals of Endgame Launch: To ensure maximum growth and smooth operations and minimize governance red tape while the first Endgame Products are released, while ensuring actual, pragmatic security of the system is not jeopardized.

Document identifiers do not have to be in order or be sequential.

2: The Governance Scope - GOV

The Governance Scope covers rules that regulate the critical balance of power, and adjudicate on appeals processes related to misalignment in the ecosystem.

2.1: Scope Improvement - GOV1

The Governance Scope must have a specialized Advisory Council that is able to propose improvements to the language of the Mutable Alignment Artifact that increase Alignment Artifact Strength and increase efficiency and security of the Maker Ecosystem.

2.1.1

The Governance Scope must have a customized strategy towards its display and interaction through the DAO Toolkit.

2.2: Atlas Immutable Alignment Artifact - GOV2

The information contained in the Atlas is the most important for determining the rules and incentives of the Maker Ecosystem, and supersedes and overrides all other competing rules or decisions. The Atlas is interpreted and used as the source of truth for determining what is Universally Aligned and what is misaligned. However, in practice it is not possible to always interpret all aspects of the Atlas directly, as the Maker Ecosystem may encounter situations that the Atlas didn’t predict. In such scenarios, it is crucial that the Atlas is interpreted in a way that is maximally Universally Aligned and prevents misalignment or slippery slope risks.

GOV2 contains the structure for Maker Governance to scrutinize and disambiguate the elements and other contents of the Atlas Immutable Alignment Artifact and define the effects and consequences in practical situations.

2.2.1

The principles for when Atlas interpretation is necessary, and how it is initiated.

2.2.1.1

This must cover the delineation between when Atlas interpretation can be used to cover shortfalls or gaps in the Atlas that are congruent with the spirit of the Atlas, and when interpretations are reaching too far and are going against the spirit of the Atlas and as a result, are misaligned.

2.2.2

Principles and processes that must be followed when deliberating and deciding on Atlas interpretations.

2.2.3

List of all settled Atlas interpretations with all necessary context.

2.3: Scope Bounded Mutable Alignment Artifacts - GOV3

Scope Mutable Alignment Artifacts (Scope Artifacts) are important tools in enabling Maker Governance to evolve over time while staying aligned with, and protected by, the Atlas. They specify in maximal practical and required detail how Maker Governance operates, within the constraints and boundaries set by the Atlas.

2.3.1

Scope Artifacts are continuously updated. Their updates must always be aligned with the specifications of the Atlas.

2.3.2

GOV3 must cover a ruleset for ossification of mutable elements, ensuring that significant changes to the Scopes take a long time and provide a lot of time for input.

2.3.3: Types of Scope Elements

2.3.3.1: Strengthening Elements

Strengthening Elements are regular elements that ossify over time and are meant to eventually never change as they reach a sufficient strength that the Letter of the Rules remain Universally Aligned. Every update to a Strengthening Element must make it stronger, more future proof and long term focused, and less likely to be changed in the future.

2.3.3.2: Active Elements

Active Elements are mutable elements that need to change as a part of the normal operations of Governance. An example are lists of active state or parameters. The rules for changing an Active Element are codified in adjacent Strengthening Elements.

2.3.3.3: Budget Elements

Budget Elements are elements that contain budgets and that can trigger valid executive votes for deploying smart contracts that can perform payments controlled by FacilitatorDAOs.

2.3.3.4: Template Elements

Template Elements are elements that specify templates used for other elements. Template Elements don’t have to follow the regular Alignment Artifact formatting standards for its subelements.

2.3.4

The Article must contain a process for ecosystem participants to petition for an appeal where they believe a Scope is misaligned, and the process for the Governance Scope to accept and process appeals, including fees and conditions.

2.3.5

The Article must contain processes for how the outcome of appeals are recorded in Scope Artifacts

2.3.6

The Article must cover specific rules related to Ecosystem Agreement appeals.

2.4: Alignment Conservers - GOV4

Alignment Conservers are external entities that play a fundamental role in facilitating and protecting the Maker Governance process by ensuring it occurs according to the processes defined in the Maker Core Alignment Artifact and with Universal Alignment. They enable MKR holders to have Universally Aligned participation in Maker Governance with minimal Inner Incentive, by ensuring it is very easy for MKR holders to make aligned decisions, and that there are strong protections against misalignment.

2.4.1: Roles of the Alignment Conservers

Alignment Conservers can have two critical roles:

• Aligned Delegate

• Facilitator

2.4.1.1

Alignment Conservers may only be operationally active in a single Alignment Conserver role. They may not simultaneously assume multiple Alignment Conserver roles, or other ecosystem roles such as Ecosystem Actors.

2.4.1.2

When assuming the special roles available to Alignment Conservers, they also become subject to additional requirements specific to their role. These role-specific requirements are described in the relevant Atlas Articles and in the Governance Scope Artifact. Breaking these requirements also means breaking the Alignment Conserver requirements.

2.4.2: Alignment Conservers Eligibility Requirements

Alignment Conservers must always act to preserve the spirit of the Atlas Immutable Alignment Artifact and to fight against, and make public, all forms of corruption, organizational drift and other misalignment threats that they discover from their embedded position near the inner workings of MakerDAO. They must be held to a high standard in terms of acting with Universal Alignment.

2.4.3

Alignment Conservers may never collude or secretly organize to change the Alignment Artifacts or the governance dynamic of MakerDAO in general, except within the clearly delineated processes and frameworks of the Maker Core Alignment Artifact.

2.4.4

If an Alignment Conserver is discovered to act against the requirements outlined in 2.4.2 and its subelements their Alignment Conserver status must immediately be derecognized by the FacilitatorDAOs. GOV4 must specify the processes for derecognition so that they are fair and minimize risk for the Maker Ecosystem.

2.4.4.1

In cases of mild “slippery slope” breaches, a warning may be given and recorded in the Governance Artifact with no further consequence for the first breach.

2.4.4.2

In severe cases that can be described as Governance Attacks, in addition to being derecognized, the Alignment Conserver is also stripped of all reputation recognized in reputation systems of the Scopes.

2.4.5: Alignment Conserver Anonymity and Privacy

Alignment Conservers are encouraged to be anonymous. Some Alignment Conserver roles are required to be anonymous, and their identities must be derecognized from acting as Alignment Conservers in general, in case their privacy is breached.

2.6: Aligned Delegates (ADs) - GOV6

ADs are Alignment Conservers that have registered based on the processes specified in the Governance Scope Artifact. ADs receive various benefits while being subject to specific requirements in addition to the general Alignment Conserver requirements. ADs have significant physical power over the Maker Protocol as they control votes obtained from delegation of voting power. As a result their focus is to protect the Maker Ecosystem against abuse of this power by themselves or others, and to use the power to protect the Maker Ecosystem in case other parts of the Governance Process take misaligned actions.

2.6.1: Protocol Delegation Modules (PDMs)

Protocol Delegation Modules are NewChain Modules that can be created and controlled by external smart contracts or accounts, and can receive delegated voting power from MKR holders and Lockstake Engine users.

2.6.1.1

PDMs function with a season system begins on the monday of the 11th full week of the first quarter of the year, and ends on the friday of the 12th full week of the first quarter of the following year. The period where seasons overlap, from the monday of the 11th full week of the first quarter to the friday of the 12th full week of the first quarter in the same year, is called the Election Season.

2.6.1.2

PDMs are Seasonally Active from the moment they are created, until the Season they were created in ends. If they are created during the Election Season, then they count as being created in the later overlapping Season. PDMs expire and lose their voting power at the end of the second season of their existence, with a total lifetime of up to approximately 2 years and 2 weeks.

2.6.1.3

Delegating to Seasonally Active PDMs will qualify Lockstake Engine users for Governance Participation Rewards throughout the entire Season, until the monday of the 12th full week of the first quarter of the year for PDMs of the earlier overlapping season.

2.6.3: Aligned Delegate Income and Participation Requirements

ADs are eligible to receive significant income from the Maker Protocol if they are among the top ADs based on total votes delegated to their delegation contracts, and they fulfill specific participation requirements. There are two income levels for ADs: Prime Delegates (PDs) that receive the highest level of income and have a degree of income security, and Reserve Aligned Delegates (RDs) that receive a lower level of income.

2.6.3.1

The Governance Scope Artifact specifies the number of PD slots, and the number of RD slots.

2.6.3.3.3

The beneficiaries of the available PD and RD slots change in real time based on the top ranking of ADs that aren’t PDs by total amount of MKR delegated to their delegation contract(s).

2.6.3.4: AD Buffer

The AD Buffer is an account of NGT and NST that builds up when an AD achieves a budget rank of either PD or RD. The budget that an AD is responsible for accumulates in the AD buffer. It cannot be spent until it contains at least 1 month's worth of budget. Once monthly, all ADs can request payments from their buffers. An AD's monthly payment request can be any amount as long as there is still at least one month worth of budget remaining after the payments are made. Payments can be requested to multiple addresses at once and can include the address that controls the AD's PDM. ADs can include descriptions of what the payments are for, which can include personal compensation, compensation to team contributors, research expenses, and more. The Governance Facilitators then include the payments in the next Executive Spell. PDs must only use the full amounts of their budgets if they are contributing significant, best in class work towards the development of the Atlas, and their budget use must generally be scaled according to their level of Atlas contributions.

2.6.3.4.1

If an AD loses all its income, or loses a part of its income by moving from PD to RD, the AD Buffer starts paying out the excess funds it contains so that it reaches 1 month's equivalent income after 1 month. In case the AD has no income, this means that all of the contents of the AD Buffer are paid out over the course of 1 month.

2.6.3.4.2

The AD Buffer is used as collateral for a whistleblower bounty in case the AD acts misaligned or has their privacy compromised.

2.6.3.5

Each of the PD and RD slots earns up to an equal share of the total compensation available to their level each month, paid out continuously in real time. The income that gets paid out can be reduced if the ADs don’t fully comply with participation requirements

2.6.3.7

Actual AD income payouts are modified by voting activity metrics for the last 3 months, which includes overall voting activity in all of the votes that the ADs are able to vote on. If an AD is active in less than 95% of all votes over the last 3 months, they receive a reduced amount of AD income. The reduction in income is proportionally linear until it reaches 0 AD income at 75% voting activity. If an AD falls below 75% voting activity over the last 3 months, it loses qualification for AD income and any AD income rank they may be eligible for is passed on to the next highest AD by total amount of MKR delegated to their delegation contract. A PD can lose their PD status this way, and even if their activity metric recovers they do not automatically become a PD again, except through the regular process of becoming a PD outside of the Election Season.

2.6.3.8

Actual AD income payouts are modified by AD communication metrics for the last 3 months, which requires the ADs to write an explanation for each vote that demonstrates its universal alignment. If the AD actively communicates on less than 95% of all votes over the last 3 months, they receive a reduced amount of AD income. The reduction in income is proportionally linear until it reaches 0 AD income at 75% communication activity over the last 3 months. If an AD falls below 75% communication activity over the last 3 months, it loses qualification for AD income and any AD income rank they may be eligible for is passed on to the next highest AD by total amount of MKR delegated to their delegation contract​​​​​​​. A PD can lose their PD status this way.

2.6.3.8

The PD slots each have a continually accruing budget equating to 650,000 NST and 3,960,000 NGT per year.

2.6.3.9

The RD slots each have a continually accruing budget equating to 100,000 NST and of 360,000 NGT per year.

2.6.5: Aligned Delegate Alignment Risk Mitigation

Delegates are not allowed to provide “kickbacks” from their compensation to MKR holders that delegate to them. Any violation of these requirements constitutes breaching the Alignment Conserver requirements.

2.6.5.1

If a FacilitatorDAO finds that an AD has performed a misaligned act or breached their requirements, they can derecognize the AD and confiscate their AD Buffer. The AD Buffer can be used as a whistleblower bounty in case an ecosystem actor provided useful data, information or evidence that led to the derecognition of the AD. GOV6 must specify sufficient safety mechanisms around the payment of the whistleblower bounty.

2.6.5.1.1

All FacilitatorDAOs must immediately review the evidence and either support the decision to derecognize the AD, or propose a vote to overturn the derecognition and penalize the FacilitatorDAO.

2.6.5.1.2

If FacilitatorDAOs fail to take action against misaligned ADs, they must be severely penalized.

2.6.6: Aligned Delegate Operational Security

ADs must maintain a high level of operational security, and follow best practice for privacy, security and physical resilience. This must be done at a level that adequately protects the Maker Ecosystem from physical risk posed by the potential for attacks against ADs. If there’s clear evidence or significant suspicion that the operational security of an AD has been compromised, or that they have failed to follow best practice or otherwise made operational security errors, FacilitatorDAOs must immediately derecognize the AD. Half of the AD Buffer can be confiscated and used as a whistleblower bounty in case an ecosystem actor responsibly provided useful information for determining that the operational security of an AD was compromised. GOV6 must specify sufficient safety mechanisms around the payment of the whistleblower bounty.

2.6.6.1

FacilitatorDAOs must err on the side of caution and act in case there is any kind of real possibility that the operational security of an AD is compromised. They are afforded a significant autonomy in making judgement calls related to operational security standards for ADs, but if there is clear indications that they are abusing this power for misaligned ends, then the FacilitatorDAO must be penalized for open misalignment.

2.6.6.1.1

All FacilitatorDAOs must immediately either support the action or propose overturning it and penalizing the FacilitatorDAO when an operational security breach derecognition is initiated. Failing to act is itself misalignment and results in penalties for all the FacilitatorDAOs that failed to act.

2.7: FacilitatorDAOs and Facilitators

FacilitatorDAOs are a type of SubDAO that can be given responsibility over MakerDAO Scopes and SubDAO Scopes in return for tokenomics rewards.

2.7.1

When a FacilitatorDAO has responsibility for an Alignment Artifact, they are fully required to follow all instructions and rules of the Alignment Artifact elements. If they fail to follow the instructions and rules correctly, they can be penalized by the Governance Scope. The penalties and process for penalizing must be specified in the Article 6 of the Governance Scope.

2.7.2: Assigning Responsibility of MakerDAO Alignment Artifacts to FacilitatorDAOs

The Governance Scope must specify a process used by Maker Governance to assign responsibility of a particular MakerDAO Alignment Artifact to a particular FacilitatorDAO. A process must be in place to enable FacilitatorDAOs to request responsibility of a MakerDAO Alignment Artifact, and in ordinary times Maker Governance should only assign responsibility of a Scope based on a request by the FacilitatorDAO.

2.7.2.1

All FacilitatorDAOs always have responsibility for the Governance Scope.

2.7.2.2

There must always be a FacilitatorDAO assigned to all Scopes, and if necessary due to extraordinary circumstances, Maker Governance must directly assign responsibility of a Scope to a FacilitatorDAO. GOV7 must ensure a process for detecting and acting on such situations to minimize risk.

2.7.2.3

If a FacilitatorDAO has responsibility for the Support Scope or the Stability Scope, they are considered Core Facilitators and cannot be assigned responsibility to SubDAO scopes.

2.7.3: Assigning Responsibility of SubDAO Scopes to FacilitatorDAOs

GOV7 must specify the process with which AllocatorDAOs and MiniDAOs can assign Responsibility of their Scopes to FacilitatorDAOs. Being assigned responsibility of a SubDAO Scope requires the FacilitatorDAO to agree to take on the full responsibility of the Scope.

2.7.3.1

Once a FacilitatorDAO has agreed to take responsibility, they cannot exit their responsibility with less than 3 months notice, unless justified by an event of misalignment or clear breach of good faith occurs.

2.7.3.2

If a FacilitatorDAO does not have responsibility for the Support Scope or the Stability Scope, they are considered SubDAO Facilitators and can be assigned responsibility to SubDAO Scopes.

2.7.4: FacilitatorDAO Responsibility Rewards

FacilitatorDAOs benefit from a special tokenomics system called FacilitatorDAO Responsibility Rewards, which rewards them based on the amount of Responsibility they have over Scopes.

A total of 300 million NewGovToken are distributed to all FacilitatorDAOs per year.

2.7.4.1: MakerDAO Scope FacilitatorDAO Responsibility Rewards

120 million goes to responsibility for MakerDAO Scopes

2.7.4.1.1

40 million is distributed proportionally to Scope Weight. Scope Weight is as follows:

| Scope | Scope Weight |

|---|---:|

| Support Scope | 3 |

| Protocol Scope | 1 |

| Stability Scope | 3 |

| Accessibility Scope | 1 |

When multiple FacilitatorDAOs are responsible for the same Scope their Scope Weight is divided between them.

2.7.4.1.2

40 million NewGovToken is distributed according to Budget Weight

Budget Weight is calculated by determining the relative amount of budget each FacilitatorDAO controls, including both fixed budgets and Allocated Budgets. When multiple FacilitatorDAOs are responsible for the same Scope, the fixed budgets of the Scope are divided between them.

2.7.4.1.2.1: Adjusted Budget Weight

In some cases Budgets will have specified an adjusted weight inside the Budget Element. This is in case the budget is not meant to be spent on a regular basis and as a result the actual number is higher than what would be used on average. The Adjusted weight must still account for the work involved in preparing for the contingency situation where the budget would need to be spent.

2.7.4.1.3: Minimum Threshold

40 million NewGovToken is distributed proportionally to all Core FacilitatorDAOs.

2.7.4.2: SubDAO Scope FacilitatorDAO Responsibility Rewards

180 million NewGovToken is provided as reward for Responsibility of SubDAO Scopes, divided accordingly:

2.7.4.2.1

80 million NewGovenToken distributed according to AllocatorDAO Weight, which is determined by the proportional amount of Maker Elixir that the AllocatorDAO holds, compared to the total amount of Maker Elixir held by all AllocatorDAOs.

2.7.4.2.2

60 million NewGovToken distributed according to MiniDAO Weight, which is determined by the proportional amount of Allocator Elixir the MiniDAO holds times the proportional amount of Maker Elixir its parent AllocatorDAO holds.

2.7.4.2.3

40 million NewGovenToken proportionally for any FacilitatorDAO that is actively Responsible for at least 1 AllocatorDAO Scope, or at least a fraction of total MiniDAO Weight equivalent to one divided by the total amount of SubDAO FacilitatorDAOs.

2.7.5: Facilitators

Facilitators are anonymous Alignment Conservers that can be engaged by FacilitatorDAOs to directly access governance processes and smart contracts that the FacilitatorDAOs control, to help ensure the FacilitatorDAO fulfills their responsibility under the Alignment Artifacts.

2.7.5.0

Facilitators allow a FacilitatorDAO to scale up its ability to be responsible for multiple Alignment Artifacts, but also create the risk of misaligned Facilitators attacking the system or stealing funds.

2.7.5.1

The FacilitatorDAOs are responsible for any wrongdoing by their chosen Facilitators, and will be penalized for any theft or abuse of budgets or protocol access. The FacilitatorDAOs have to manage this risk through carefully set, limited permissions and fallback mechanisms that ensure the FacilitatorDAOs cannot take a significant loss in the worst case scenario.

2.7.5.2 Facilitator Operational Security

Facilitators must maintain a high level of operational security, and follow best practice for privacy, security and physical resilience. This must be done at a level that adequately protects the Maker Ecosystem from physical risk posed by the potential for attacks against Facilitators. If there’s clear evidence or significant suspicion that the operational security of a Facilitator has been compromised, or that they have failed to follow best practice or otherwise made operational security errors, FacilitatorDAOs must immediately derecognize the Facilitator. The FacilitatorDAO that chose a Facilitator that is found to have inadequate operational security must be penalized unless they act immediately to derecognize the Facilitator.

2.7.5.2.1

FacilitatorDAOs must err on the side of caution and act in case there is any kind of real possibility that the operational security of an Facilitator is compromised. They are afforded a significant autonomy in making judgement calls related to operational security standards for Facilitators, but if there is clear indications that they are abusing this power for misaligned ends, then the FacilitatorDAO must be penalized for open misalignment.

2.7.5.2.1.1

All FacilitatorDAOs must immediately either support the action or propose overturning it and penalizing the FacilitatorDAO when an operational security breach derecognition is initiated. Failing to act is itself misalignment and results in penalties for all the FacilitatorDAOs that failed to act.

2.7.6: Decision-Making powers of FacilitatorDAOs

FacilitatorDAOs can make interpretations and take discretionary decisions based on the language of the Alignment Artifacts. 2.2 and 2.3 of The Atlas and GOV2 and GOV3 place significant checks and restrictions on how FacilitatorDAOs can do this. FacilitatorDAOs are not meant to be experts on how to run ordinary business operations, but instead must follow the instructions and make judgment calls based on the language contained in the Scopes.

2.7.6.1

All FacilitatorDAO decisions related to ordinary operations must be clearly explained and justified based on public information. FacilitatorDAOs must not claim to make decisions based on some internal knowledge or undisclosed data.

2.7.6.1.0

Generally, FacilitatorDAOs are supposed to minimally "think for themselves" and instead just faithfully follow the instructions of the Scopes and focus on the critical role of monitoring that the spirit of the Alignment Artifacts isn't violated.

2.7.6.2

FacilitatorDAOs are allowed to take unilateral action based on the Alignment Artifacts in determining whether an Alignment Conserver or other governance participants are acting misaligned and must be derecognized. If there is evidence that an Alignment Conserver needs to be derecognized, all FacilitatorDAOs are responsible for taking action.

2.7.6.2.1

FacilitatorDAOs that fail to take action against misalignment must be penalized, including failure to promptly derecognize ACs that have acted misaligned.

2.7.6.2.2

FacilitatorDAOs control one or more EGF instances and must immediately remove derecognized ACs from their instances of the EGF.

2.7.6.2.2.0

To prevent the damage possible for malicious or negligent abuse of the derecognition powers, each FacilitatorDAO controls only specific EGF instances. This means a single rogue FacilitatorDAO cannot instantly cut off all EGF access to an AD.

2.7.6.2.3

If FacilitatorDAOs act misaligned and abuse the ability to derecognize ACs or abuse other leverage available to them under the guise of penalizing misaligned actions, they must themselves be severely penalized.

2.7.6.2.3.1

All other FacilitatorDAOs must also be penalized if they don't immediately propose penalties when a FacilitatorDAO takes misaligned actions. If all FacilitatorDAOs are simultaneously misaligned, the situation can be resolved through the whistleblower process.

2.7.6.2.4

All the restrictions that apply to FacilitatorDAOs also apply to Facilitators. Facilitators cannot directly engage with counterparties. The only exception to this rule is in situations where Facilitators are coordinating to set up governance processes, if the interactions are clearly documented.

2.7.7.0

It is critically important that all interactions by the Facilitators are documented, so there is clear documentation that details what work is required for the governance processes to function. This reduces the risk that things will fail if a particular Facilitator becomes inactive for any reason.

2.8: Professional Ecosystem Actors - GOV8

Professional Ecosystem Actors are external actors that are paid through the Scopes to do important work that benefit the MakerDAO ecosystem. Two types of Professional Ecosystem Actors exist: Advisory Council Members and Active Ecosystem Actors. Advisory Council Members is the most direct check on Active Ecosystem Actors, and as a result there is significant conflict of interest risk that must be avoided by ensuring Ecosystem Actors always fall into only one category or the other.

2.8.1: Advisory Council Member Ecosystem Actors

Advisory Council Member Ecosystem Actors perform research and publish advice for the DAO to use in improving the Scopes Artifacts and their contained processes. Often, this is used as a check for choosing the best Active Ecosystem Actors available to supply a need defined in a Scope Artifact. The work of Advisory Council Members is implemented exclusively through modifications to the Scope Artifacts, and can also be used to receive advice regarding the specific interpretation of Scope Artifacts (which, if followed, must then be included in the Scope Artifact).

The Scope Artifact improvements researched and suggested by the Advisory Council Members are presented to the ACs who then determine to what extent they want to follow their suggestions for designing MIP102s.

2.8.2: Active Ecosystem Actors

Active Ecosystem Actors work according to the specifications of Scope Alignment Artifacts to receive funding for performing specific projects such as developing new features, performing data collection or analysis, performing marketing, growth, outreach or educational activities, legal work, government outreach, and other operational activities that benefit the Maker Ecosystem. Active Ecosystem Actors are the only type of actor that interacts with the Scopes that is allowed to do “real work” that isn’t strictly defined in, and bounded by, the Alignment Artifacts.

2.9: Interaction of Aligned Delegates, FacilitatorDAOs, and Advisory Council - GOV9​​​​​​​

2.9.3: FacilitatorDAOs and Scope Advisory Councils

A critical governance interaction is ACs getting professional input from Advisory Council Members about specific improvements that are possible in the Scope Alignment Artifacts. This happens with the FacilitatorDAOs following the instructions defined in the Advisory Council Articles. FacilitatorDAOs can also provide input directly to ACs.

2.9.3.2

FacilitatorDAOs follow the instructions in the Advisory Council Articles to propose the onboarding of new Advisory Council Members, and to allocate resources for Advisory Projects to existing Advisory Council Members.

2.10: Core Governance Security - GOV10

GOV10 must cover Governance Security processes for deploying and reviewing executive votes. This must include multiple types of security review and automated tests.

2.11: SubDAO Governance Security - GOV11

GOV11 must cover the minimum security rules related to SubDAO governance actions. This includes ensuring SubDAOs do not take unnecessary technical risk. It also covers defining and preserving the MKR holder veto over all SubDAO governance actions. Attempts by SubDAOs to circumvent or remove the protections from the MKR voter veto is considered misalignment.

2.12: Scope Bootstrapping - GOV12

Before the Endgame State, the Governance Scope articles must be modified to accommodate the needs of the bootstrapping phase leading up to the Endgame State, and to minimize transition costs and friction. GOV12 must also contain processes for quickly fixing issues in any scopes that put the bootstrapping of governance at risk.

The bootstrapping measures can override requirements and specifications in the Atlas as long as they are temporary and needed, and must all come to an end when the NewChain is launched.

3: The Support Scope

The Support Scope covers various critical tasks that support the ecosystem, including governance process infrastructure and management, SubDAO and Ecosystem Actor support, and management of the Public Good Purpose System.

3.1: Scope improvement - SUP1

SUP1 must cover the key specifications and processes necessary for the Scope to reliably improve itself long term without risk of misalignment.

3.1.1

The Support Scope must have a specialized Advisory Council that is able to propose improvements to the language of the Scope Artifact that increases its Alignment Artifact Strength and increase efficiency and security of the Maker Ecosystem.

3.1.2

The Support Scope must have a customized strategy towards its display and interaction through the DAO Toolkit to make it maximally user friendly.

3.3: DAO Toolkit Core Development - SUP3

The DAO Toolkit is a unified system for displaying the Alignment Artifacts and all of the data, processes and interaction necessary for Maker Governance and internal SubDAO governance to function optimally. It is distributed by all AllocatorDAOs and FacilitatorDAOs as a part of their SubDAO Frontend. SUP3 must cover all necessary processes to ensure its underlying technology develops appropriately.

3.3.1

Core Development and Maintenance Management and Strategy.

3.3.2

Identification and development of standardized, common reusable modules.

3.3.5

Research and specification of best practice for using the DAO Toolkit by Scopes.

3.3.6

Monitoring of adherence with best practice and flagging to governance in case of issues.

3.3.7

Development of the client side Tookit AI systems for using the DAO Toolkit and interacting with the CAIS.

3.3.8

Contributor and Alignment Conserver privacy tools and support.

3.4: Core Artificial Intelligence System (CAIS) - SUP4

MakerDAO must have a cutting edge system of diversified AI tools that is accessible by Alignment Conservers and tokengated for MKR holders and SubDAO token holders.

3.4.1

SUP4 must define a robust and aligned solution for the core model to ensure it will have the greatest possible positive impact on the ability of Maker Governance to strengthen the Alignment Artifacts and monitor all governance processes for alignment and efficiency. The Core Model must also be a powerful tool for the incubation and growth of the SubDAOs.

3.4.2

The CAIS must use a technical approach that is diversified, and continuously improved based on the latest science and practical experience of operating and using the CAIS.

3.4.3

SUP4 must maintain a well balanced model for token gating access to CAIS, weighted in favor of MKR holders but ensuring that SubDAO token holders can also access and unleash the benefit of CAIS for SubDAO governance, innovation and growth.

3.5: Budgets, Milestones and results reporting standardization - SUP5

SUP5 must ensure that there is a solid baseline understanding of how to measure and monitor results and how to distinguish between goals that actually benefit the DAO and goals that are misaligned.

3.5.1

SUP5 must develop and maintain best practices for how to ensure budgets are tightly connected to results and milestones, and that this connection is easy to understand and it is possible to comprehend whether a budget is performing or not.

3.5.2

SUP5 must ensure that there is adequate research into hidden risks that may compromise transparency over time or hide inadequate results.

3.5.3

SUP5 must ensure processes are in place for monitoring and flagging of failure to properly implement best practice to prevent risks.

3.5.4

SUP5 must contain a real time, up to date overview of all data and information relevant to understand budgets and the results they are producing.

3.6: SubDAO Incubation - SUP6

New SubDAOs are continuously created by the core protocol logic of NewChain, and SUP6 must ensure that the necessary infrastructure is available to maximally support this incubation process and support the new SubDAOs in generating as much value as possible for the Maker Ecosystem.

3.6.1

SUP6 must specify Genesis Scope template elements designed for FacilitatorDAOs, AllocatorDAOs and MiniDAOs, to ensure that they have everything they need from the moment they are incubated to function properly and carry out their specific roles.

3.6.2

There is always a Major SubDAO incubating, and as it is incubating the communication channels for its future community must be maintained and moderated, based on specifications provided in SUP6.

3.7: Ecosystem Actor Incubation - SUP7

Alongside the new Major SubDAOs that continuously incubate, SUP7 must ensure the proper elements are in place to incubate relevant Ecosystem Actors that can support the new SubDAOs

3.7.1

Clear Incubation Objectives must be specified that describe what gaps and opportunities exist in the ecosystem that Maker Governance wants to promote new companies to inject innovation for.

3.7.2

SUP7 must specify a strong proposal review process that describes how Facilitators must review and choose Incubation Proposals. AVCs or MKR holders must not interfere or micromanage with the selection process beyond setting objective guidelines, as this creates significant risk misalignment.

3.7.3

A high quality milestone and budget review process must be defined that applies specifically to Incubating Ecosystem Actors, in addition to the regular requirements specified in SUP5.

3.7.4

Infrastructure for monitoring and recording currently incubating Ecosystem Actors.

3.7.5

Maker Governance is allowed to have a relatively granular influence on the long run development of the ecosystem through SUP7, and as a result it must be monitored for misalignment risks, and must develop checks and balances that are as robust as possible over time.

3.8: Ecosystem communication channels - SUP8

SUP8 must cover the overall unified communication infrastructure used for governance ecosystem communication, including channels for inter-SubDAO communication and Ecosystem Actor interaction.

3.9: Ecosystem Agreements - SUP9

SUP9 must specify and standardize how Ecosystem Agreements work, to make it as convenient and easy as possible for Ecosystem Actors to do business in the Maker Ecosystem with guardrails and fair treatment.

3.9.1

SUP9 must specify a standardized way to publish and formally agree to Ecosystem Agreements.

3.9.2

SUP9 must specify a process for Ecosystem Agreement standardization that ensures that recurring patterns are dealt with uniformly, and that deviations from established standard patterns will incur proportional penalties and still be treated in the standardized way.

3.9.3

SUP9 must cover the methods for Ecosystem Agreement enforcement.

3.9.4

SUP9 must cover dispute resolution and the appeals process.

3.10: Resilience Fund - SUP10

SUP10 must cover the Resilience Fund, including relevant definitions and a secure claims process.

3.11: Resilience Research and Preparedness - SUP11

SUP11 must cover the resilience research and preparedness efforts.

3.12: Purpose System - SUP12

The Purpose System aims to fund public good open source AI and software projects that benefit the Maker Ecosystem and public good. At all times, at least 10% of the Purpose System funds must be used for more direct and specific impact solutions.

3.12.1

The Maker Protocol emits 60 million NewGovToken per year for the Purpose System from the moment NewChain is launched.

3.12.2

SUP12 must cover the long term Purpose System and the process for allocating purpose funds to SubDAOs in the yearly purpose contest, from the moment NewChain is launched.

4: The Protocol Scope

The Protocol Scope covers all processes related to developing and maintaining NewChain and its core protocol, modules and smart contract ecosystem, and its bridges to other blockchains. It also covers other situations where the Maker Protocol has direct technical over something relevant to Maker Governance.

4.1: Scope Improvement - PRO1

PRO1 must cover the key specifications and processes necessary for the Scope to reliably improve itself long term without risk of misalignment.

4.1.1

The Protocol Scope must have a specialized Advisory Council that is able to propose improvements to the language of the Scope Artifact that increases its Alignment Artifact Strength and increase efficiency and security of the Maker Ecosystem.

4.1.2

The Protocol Scope must have a customized strategy towards its display and interaction through the DAO Toolkit to make it maximally user friendly.

4.2: NewChain Protocol Specification, Maintenance and Upgrades - PRO2

NewChain contains the complete Endgame specification and its deployment causes the Maker Ecosystem to reach the Endgame State. PRO2 must cover the required preparatory and development work to enable Maker Governance to activate NewChain and reach the Endgame State.

4.2.1: General Blockchain Requirements

4.2.1.1

NewChain must support native delegation compatible with the Lockstake Engine, and the staking power of nodes must be regulated by Maker Governance.

4.2.1.2

NewChain must have state rent.

4.2.1.3

Gas fees and state rent must be paid with NewGovToken, staking must be done with NewGovToken.

4.2.1.4

NewChain must have native protocol MEV capture.

4.2.1.5

NewChain must have a chain halt mechanism triggered by NewGovToken executive vote for scheduled chain upgrades or through an emergency halt mechanism where only a minority of NewGovToken voters are required. When a chain halt occurs, the chain must be restarted through a hard fork. This is specified in more in detail in 4.6.

4.2.1.6

Native ZK rollups built into the protocol.

4.2.1.7

Neural Tokenomics and core governance processes built natively into the NewChain protocol. Specified in more detail in 4.3.

4.3: NewChain Native Governance Mechanics and Neural Tokenomics - PRO3

NewChain implements as native protocol modules all of the internal governance mechanics, incubation mechanics and tokenomics of MakerDAO and SubDAOs. PRO3 must cover the required preparatory and development work relevant for these concepts to enable Maker Governance to activate NewChain and reach the Endgame State.

4.3.1

The Core Pause Proxy of MakerDAO, has a governance delay defined by PRO3 and is used to hold external assets and perform forced liquidation or forced actions on SubDAOs.

4.3.2

The SubDAO proxies are core governance contracts that enable SubDAOs to take actions to create and control smart contracts. They have a security delay, and Maker Governance can veto their actions during this security delay. The safety measures around using the veto must be specified in PRO3.

4.3.3

NewGovToken and SubDAO tokens are covered by a protocol native token standard. As they are permanently inflationary, SubDAO tokens have a migration standard as they will need to migrate to new tokens in the long run when their supply gets too high.

4.3.4

The Incubator system creates new AllocatorDAOs and FacilitatorDAOs based on a fixed algorithm.

4.3.4.1

If there are less than 5 AllocatorDAOs, the Incubator immediately creates the amount of AllocatorDAOs required to bring the total to 5.

4.3.4.2

If there are less than 3 FacilitatorDAOs, the Incubator immediately incubates the amount of FacilitatorDAOs required to bring the total to 3.

4.3.4.3

If less than or equal to one third of all major SubDAOs are FacilitatorDAOs, then the next incubation will be a FacilitatorDAO.

4.3.4.4

If more than one third of all major SubDAOs are FacilitatorDAOs, then the next incubation will be an AllocatorDAO.

4.3.4.5

If 8 or more SubDAOs exist, then a new SubDAO is incubated at a time interval since the last SubDAO incubation. The interval in years is equivalent to the larger number of 1 or (number of SubDAOs divided by 16)^1.5.

4.3.5

The Native token standard allows NewGovToken and SubDAO tokens, and other tokens made with the Native token standard, to embed their tokens into an NFT following the native NFT standard, or mint a new NFT and embed into it. A token standard NFT can have its tokens extracted from the NFT again through the NFT marketplace simulation which penalizes extracting tokens from the NFT if a lot of users are extracting at the same time. The income from the penalties are then earned by the remaining NFT holders, increasing the amount of tokens embedded in their NFT.

4.3.5.1

The parameters for extracting NewGovToken and SubDAO tokens from NFTs are 1% of the total embedded supply that can be extracted per day, and users willing to pay the highest penalty are extracted first.

4.3.6

Native NewStable farms for farming NewGovToken and SubDAO tokens. Supports 4 modes of farming:

4.3.6.1: Free Token Farming

This mode of farming gives the user tokens that are not lockstaked in the relevant lockstaking engine. The amount of tokens farmed are reduced by an amount equivalent to half of the relevant lockstaking exit fee.

4.3.6.2: Free NFT Farming

This mode of farming embeds tokens into the users free NFT that is not lockstaked in the relevant lockstaking engine. The amount of tokens embedded are reduced by an amount equivalent to half of the relevant lockstaking exit fee.

4.3.6.3 Lockstaked Token Farming

This mode of farming gives the user tokens that are lockstaked in the tokens native lockstaking engine.

4.3.6.4: Lockstaked NFT farming

This mode of farming embeds tokens into the users lockstaked NFT that is lockstaked into the tokens native lockstaking engine.

4.3.7: Maker Lockstake Engine

The Maker Lockstake Engine enables users to lock up their NewGovToken or NFT embedded with NewGovToken.

4.3.7.1

The Maker Lockstake Engine is usually accessed through an EGF, and using it requires that the NewGovTokens are delegated.

4.3.7.2

When lockstaked, NewGovTokens can farm any of the Major SubDAO tokens, or Dai from the Maker Surplus Buffer. The SubDAO tokens can be farmed either as free tokens, free NFTs, or Lockstaked NFTs.

4.3.7.3

NewGovTokens can also be used to generate Dai, with parameters set by the Stability Scope.

4.3.7.4

The Maker Lockstake Engine has an exit fee of 15%, when NewGovTokens exit the Maker Lockstake Engine 15% of the tokens or embedded tokens are burned. Additionally, for Lockstaked tokens, there is a 3 day delay until the tokens are free and can be sold.

4.3.7.4.1

When new tokens or NFTs with embedded tokens are lockstaked, the Maker Lockstake Engine emits NewGovToken equivalent to the exit fee in advance (15% of the newly lockstaked tokens) and sends them to the Maker Reverse Burn Engine.

4.3.8: Facilitator Lockstake Engine

Each Facilitator is incubated with a native Facilitator Lockstake Engine. The Facilitator Lockstake Engine enables users to Lockstake an NFT embedded with FacilitatorDAO tokens.

4.3.8.1

The Facilitator Lockstake Engine is usually accessed through an EGF, and using it requires that the embedded FaciltiatorDAO tokens are delegated.

4.3.8.2

When lockstaked, the embedded FacilitatorDAO tokens self-farm additional FacilitatorDAO tokens that are directly embedded into the existing lockstaked NFT.

4.3.8.3

The FacilitatorDAO Lockstake Engine has an exit fee of 30%, when FacilitatorDAO tokens exit the FacilitatorDAO Lockstake Engine 30% of the tokens are transferred to a yield boost pool that increase the self- farming of the Lockstake Engine by transferring 1% of its contents per day as extra self-farming to the Facilitator Lockstake Engine users.

4.3.9: Allocator Lockstake Engine

Each Allocator is incubated with a native Allocator Lockstake Engine. The Allocator Lockstake Engine enables users to lock up their AllocatorDAO tokens or NFT embedded with AllocatorDAO tokens.

4.3.9.1

The Allocator Lockstake Engine is usually accessed through an EGF, and using it requires that the AllocatorDAO tokens are delegated.

4.3.9.2

When lockstaked the AllocatorDAO tokens farm the AllocatorDAOs MiniDAO tokens. The MiniDAO tokens can be farmed as free tokens, free NFTs, or Lockstaked NFTs.

4.3.9.3

The Allocator Lockstake Engine has an exit fee of 25%, when AllocatorDAO tokens exit the Allocator Lockstake Engine 25% of the tokens are transferred to a yield boost pool that provide self-farming farming for the Lockstake Engine users by transferring 1% of its contents per day as self-farming directly embedded into the Lockstaked NFTs of the Allocator Lockstake Engine users.

4.3.10: MiniDAO Lockstake Engine

Each MiniDAO is incubated with a native MiniDAO Lockstake Engine. The MiniDAO Lockstake Engine enables users to Lockstake an NFT embedded with MiniDAO tokens.

4.3.10.1

The MiniDAO Lockstake Engine is usually accessed through an EGF, and using it requires that the embedded MiniDAO tokens are delegated.

4.3.10.2

When lockstaked, the embedded MiniDAO tokens self-farm additional MiniDAO tokens that are directly embedded into the existing lockstaked NFT.

4.3.10.3

The MiniDAO Lockstake Engine has an exit fee of 40%, when MiniDAO tokens exit the MiniDAO Lockstake Engine 40% of the tokens are transferred to a yield boost pool that increase the self- farming of the MiniDAO Lockstake Engine by transferring 1% of its contents per day as extra self-farming to the MiniDAO Lockstake Engine users.

4.3.11: NewGovToken Emissions

The Neural Tokenomics emits up to 2 billion NewGovTokens per year to power all of the tokenomics of the Maker Ecosystem.

MKR is reversibly convertable to NewGovToken at the ratio of 1:24,000. So 1 MKR becomes 24,000 NewGovToken, and vice versa.

4.3.11.1

1.8 billion NewGovToken emissions that are recaptured.

Recapturing the value of the emissions means that the emissions directly drive users or income to the protocol in some form.

4.3.11.1.1: 920 million NewGovToken to AllocatorDAO Axon

920 million NewGovToken per year are sent to the AllocatorDAO Axon from where it is distributed to the AllocatorDAOs based on their Elixir holdings.

4.3.11.1.2: 300 million Facilitator Responsibility Rewards

300 million NewGovToken per year are sent to the FacilitatorDAO Responsibility Reward system from where it is distributed to FacilitatorDAOs based on their Scope Responsibilities.

4.3.11.1.3: 240 million NewGovToken to FacilitatorDAO Axon

240 million NewGovToken per year are sent to the FacilitatorDAO Axon from where it is distributed to the FacilitatorDAOs based on their Elixir holdings.

4.3.11.1.4: 200 million NewGovToken to Dai NewGovToken farming

200 million NewGovToken per year are available in the standard Dai farms.

4.3.11.1.5: 140 million to SubDAO Incubation

140 million NewGovToken per year accumulate in the Incubators reserve burn engine, and are used to fund the next SubDAO that launches.

4.3.11.2

200 million Governance upkeep emissions that are not recaptured.

4.3.11.2.1: 60 million NewGovToken for Prime Delegates

Prime Delegates receive 60 million NewGovToken per year paid out through the AD PDMs.

4.3.11.2.2: 60 million NewGovToken for Purpose System

60 million NewGovToken are accumulated per year in the Purpose System account, from where it is distributed to one of the AllocatorDAOs each year, based on their public impact performance.

4.3.11.2.3: 40 million to Validator operation rewards

40 million NewGovToken are distributed per year in staking rewards to the NewChain validators. These rewards do not go to Lockstake Engine Lockstakers, who automatically stake to the Validators through their chosen delegates.

4.3.11.2.4: 20 million NewGovToken to Reserve Delegates

Reserve Delegates receive 20 million NewGovToken per year paid out through the AD PDMs.

4.3.12: AllocatorDAO Emissions

AllocatorDAOs have a genesis token emission that occurs over the first 10 years of its existence, and an additional permanent emission that continuously occurs forever.

4.3.12.1: AllocatorDAO Farm Distribution

70% of all AllocatorDAO tokens emitted for farming are for Dai farming, and 30% of all AllocatorDAO tokens emitted for farming are for Lockstake Engine users.

4.3.12.2: AllocatorDAO Genesis Emissions

The Genesis emissions of Allocators are 4.6 billion tokens over 10 years, with the following breakdown.

4.3.12.2.1: Genesis Farming Emissions

4 billion Allocator tokens are for Genesis farming.

4.3.12.2.1.1

For the first 2 years, the rate of Genesis farming is 1 billion AllocatorDAO tokens per year

4.3.12.2.1.2

For the following 2 years, the rate of Genesis farming is 500 million AllocatorDAO tokens per year.

4.3.12.2.1.3

For the following 2years, the rate of Genesis farming is 250 million AllocatorDAO tokens per year.

4.3.12.2.1.4

For the final 4 years, the rate of Genesis farming is 125 million AllocatorDAO tokens per year.

4.3.12.2.2

The workforce bonus pool starts with 600 million AllocatorDAO tokens. The Workforce bonus pool can be further topped up through the permanent emissions.

4.3.12.3: AllocatorDAO Permanent Emissions

The permanent emissions of AllocatorDAOs are a total of 10% tokens emitted per year.

4.3.12.3.1: Permanent MiniDAO Axon Emissions

5% of the total supply is emitted per year for the MiniDAO Axon.

4.3.12.3.2: Permanent Farming Emissions

3.75% of the total supply is emitted per year as farming emissions

4.3.12.3.3: Permanent Workforce Bonus Pool Emissions

1% of the total supply is emitted per year as workforce bonus pool emissions, if the workforce bonus pool contains less than 5% of the total supply of AllocatorDAO tokens.

4.3.12.3.4: Permanent Purpose System Emissions

0.25% of the total supply is emitted per year for the Purpose System.

4.3.13: FacilitatorDAO Emissions

FacilitatorDAOs have a genesis token emission that occurs over the first 10 years of its existence, and an additional permanent emission that continuously occurs forever.

4.3.13.1: FacilitatorDAO Farm Distribution

70% of all FacilitatorDAO tokens emitted for farming are for Dai farming, and 30% of all FacilitatorDAO tokens emitted for farming are for Lockstake Engine users.

4.3.13.2: FacilitatorDAO Genesis Emissions

The Genesis emissions of Facilitators are 4.6 billion tokens over 10 years, with the following breakdown.

4.3.13.2.1: Genesis Farming Emissions

4 billion FacilitatorDAO tokens are for Genesis farming.

4.3.13.2.1.1

For the first 2 years, the rate of Genesis farming is 1 billion FacilitatorDAO tokens per year

4.3.13.2.1.2

For the following 2 years, the rate of Genesis farming is 500 million FacilitatorDAO tokens per year.

4.3.13.2.1.3

For the following 2 years, the rate of Genesis farming is 250 million FacilitatorDAO tokens per year.

4.3.13.2.1.4

For the final 4 years, the rate of Genesis farming is 125 million FacilitatorDAO tokens per year.

4.3.13.2.2

The workforce bonus pool starts with 600 million FacilitatorDAO tokens. The Workforce bonus pool can be further topped up through the permanent emissions.

4.9: Scope Bootstrapping - PRO9

Before NewChain launch the Protocol Scope must be adapted to accommodate the bootstrapping of the ecosystem. This allows parts of the Atlas to be temporarily overridden when needed to ensure a smooth launch and bootstrapping phase. This ends with the launch of NewChain.

5: The Stability Scope

The Stability Scope covers the management of the Dai Stablecoin. The Dai Stablecoin must be a permissionless and useful currency available to anyone. Its stability and risk must be managed to generate as much value for MakerDAO and public good as possible.

5.1: Stability Scope Improvement - STA1

STA1 must cover the key specifications and processes necessary for the Scope to reliably improve itself long term without risk of misalignment.

5.1.1

The Stability Scope must have a specialized Advisory Council that is able to propose improvements to the language of the Scope Artifact that increases its Alignment Artifact Strength and increase efficiency and security of the Maker Ecosystem.

5.1.2

The Stability Scope must have a customized strategy towards its display and interaction through the DAO Toolkit to make it maximally user friendly.

5.3: Core Stability Parameters - STA3

The Dai Stablecoin is stabilized with the help of the core stability parameters. STA3 must specify principles and processes for optimizing these core stability parameters to be Universally Aligned with their purpose.

5.3.2: The Dai Savings Rate

The Dai Savings Rate is the rate Dai holders can earn on their Dai in the Dai Savings Rate smart contracts. It is determined algorithmically based on the Base Rate and the DSR Spread parameter.

5.3.3: Price Deviation Sensitivity

Price Deviation Sensitivity is an algorithmic parameter set by Maker Governance that uses the Dai Price Oracle to determine if Dai is above or below its target price. If Dai is above the target price, the Base Rate is reduced. If Dai is below the target price, the Base Rate is increased. The rate of increase or decrease is determined by the algorithm chosen by Maker Governance with the aim of maximizing the Stability of Dai.

5.5: Real World Assets - STA5

Real World Assets are assets used as collateral for the Dai Stablecoin that are enforced through legal recourse by Arranged Structures. They have unique risks that must be safeguarded against.

5.5.1: Arranged Structures

Arranged Structures are special legal structures set up by Ecosystem Actors to secure Real World Assets to help stabilize the Maker Ecosystem. PRO5 must define strict and detailed standards for how to properly establish, fund, interact with, monitor, improve and wind down Arranged Structures. Each Arranged Structure has a Conduit system that is automatically connected to all AllocatorDAOs, and allows them to send and receive Dai or other assets.

5.5.1.1

Arranged Structures must have an AllocatorDAO owner. The owner assigns instructions to the Arranged Structure on behalf of MakerDAO, and determines if and how other AllocatorDAOs can access the Conduit of the Arranged Structure.

5.5.2: Arrangers

Arrangers are Ecosystem Actors that assist in the design and operation of Arranged Structures. They are generally prohibited from ever being in a position where they can cause damage or loss to the Maker Ecosystem, beyond delays or annoyance. They advise in the creation of Arranged Structures, and Arranged Structures must always have an Arranger attached to it, to perform reporting on it. All details related to this must be covered in PRO6. The Arrangers manage a restricted function on the Arranged Structure Conduit that allows them to send assets onwards to the predetermined blockchain account of the Arranged Structure.

5.5.2.1

The AllocatorDAO owner of the Arranged Structure can change the blockchain account of the Arranged Structure and change the Arranger.

5.9: Surplus Buffer and Smart Burn Engine - STA9

STA9 must cover the processes for setting various economic parameters related to Maker Protocol Surplus.

5.9.1: Surplus Buffer Upper Limit

The Surplus Buffer Upper Limit determines when the Surplus Buffer sends its funds to the Smart Burn Engine.

5.11: MKR Backstop - STA11

If the Dai Stablecoin becomes undercollateralized, the Maker Protocol will automatically generate and sell MKR to recapitalize the system.

5.11.1

STA11 must define an emissions rate for the MKR backstop function that prevents risk of sudden failure. This must be continuously assessed and improved to maximize stability of the system in worst case scenarios.

5.11.2

STA11 must define a maximum level of MKR emission per undercollateralization event. This must be continuously assessed and improved to maximize stability of the system in worst case scenarios.

5.11.3

The protocol must contain an override mechanism that allows Maker Governance to continue emitting MKR beyond the maximum level. STA11 must cover processes for research and principles for which situations it should and can be safely used.

5.11.4

The protocol must contain an MKR backstop halt mechanism that immediately halts the backstop event in case of severe risk of total failure.

5.11.5

In case the backstop limit is reached and not overridden, or in case the backstop is halted during the event, the Dai target price receives a haircut to settle the remaining bad debt of the system. STA11 must cover this worst case scenario and research ways the damage can be mitigated.

5.14: Scope Bootstrapping - STA14

STA14 must cover all necessary measures to ensure the Stability Scope is properly bootstrapped before NewChain is launched and the Endgame State is reached. During the bootstrapping phase other Atlas Articles may be temporarily overridden if necessary for ensuring the success of the bootstrapping, until NewChain is launched.

6: The Accessibility Scope

The Accessibility Scope covers accessibility and distribution efforts, and regulates user-facing frontends of MakerDAO Core and SubDAOs. Operational rules are defined in the Accessibility Scope Mutable Alignment Artifact, which can specify and optimize behavior and processes within the following constraints.

6.1: Scope improvement - ACC1

ACC1 must cover the key specifications and processes necessary for the Scope to reliably improve itself long term without risk of misalignment.

6.1.1

The Accessibility Scope must have a specialized Advisory Council that is able to propose improvements to the language of the Scope Artifact that increases its Alignment Artifact Strength and increase efficiency and security of the Maker Ecosystem.

6.1.2

The Accessibility Scope must have a customized strategy towards its display and interaction through the DAO Toolkit to make it maximally user friendly.

6.2: Brand Identity - ACC2

ACC2 must specify the brand identity of Maker, and processes for refining and improving the details and examples of the brand identity to ensure it is as good as possible. The brand should be reliable and stable over the long term.

6.3: Accessibility Reward System - ACC3

ACC3 must specify accessibility reward systems for third party frontends and SubDAOs to incentivize them to attract NewStable users, DSR users and SubDAO farm users. ACC3 must also specify an accessibility reward uniquely available to SubDAOs that bring MKR holders to Lockstake into the Sagittarius Lockstaking Engine.

6.4: Accessibility Assets - ACC4

ACC4 must specify principles and processes for managing the accessibility assets, such as communication channels and communication presence on external websites.

6.5: Accessibility Campaigns - ACC5

ACC5 must specify principles and processes for managing accessibility campaigns.